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The revelation that some clinicians in Britain have agreed to undertake Sex-
Selective Abortions (SSAs) has brought several ethical issues to the fore. Two
philosophers analyse the complex arguments surrounding this banned practice,
from differing points of view. Jeremy Williams makes the case that SSA could be
right in some particular circumstances. But Heather Widdows emphasises the
moral dangers involved in permitting SSA.
Many people seem convinced that sex-selective abortion is morally
unacceptable. But explaining why is more difficult than one might suppose.
Jeremy Williams suggests that those who oppose SSA outright should pause to
consider whether there are cases where it could actually be considered just.
The topic of sex-selective abortion (SSA) has recently featured prominently in the
news, owing to an undercover investigation by The Daily Telegraph, which found that some private
practitioners were willing to perform them. Those reacting to this story seemed overwhelmingly to
agree that it is morally objectionable for a woman to abort on grounds of the fetus’ sex, or for the
state to allow her to do so. But whilst there was a great deal of certainty on that point, there was little
elaboration as to why SSA should be considered objectionable. I want to suggest that opposition to
SSA is rather more difficult to sustain than one might suppose – at least for those of us who share
some commonplace pro-choice beliefs.
Opponents of SSA often assume that nobody could have a valid reason for wanting a child of a
particular sex, and that any preference a parent might have must be merely self-indulgent. Not true,
however: in at least some cases, a woman could have very compelling grounds for wanting,
specifically, a boy or a girl. Take the woman who was sexually abused by her mother as a child, and
cannot form close relationships with other females. Or the woman whose husband will leave her and
her children in poverty if she has yet another girl. To these individuals, the sex of their child matters
crucially.
Now, legal scholars have speculated that UK law might conceivably permit some SSAs, under the
so-called ‘social ground’. This allows abortion within the first 24 weeks, when it is needed to protect
the mental and physical health of the woman, or her dependent children. As yet, there has been no
legal case testing this (as LSE’s own Emily Jackson pointed out to the Telegraph). But irrespective
of whether existing law would allow SSA in cases like the ones I have described, doesn’t it seem
plausible that it should? After all, the women in my examples do not want to abort on trivial grounds.
On the contrary, they are aiming, respectively, to protect their mental wellbeing, and to protect
themselves and their children from poverty. On a pro-choice view, women have a right to choose
abortion for those reasons.
Of course, some people object to SSA on grounds that fetuses are persons with rights to equal
treatment, including rights against sex discrimination. However, the claim that fetuses have rights
poses a challenge not just to SSA, but to abortion generally. It is not a claim that we can easily make
if we are pro-choice advocates, yet attempting to argue against SSA specifically.
And precisely for this reason, others (notably feminists) have argued that SSA represents an
injustice not to fetuses, but to existing girls and women. In particular, they argue that SSA expresses
a negative message about the status and worth of females, making it more difficult to achieve
gender equality in society. This sort of objection is hard to make, though, if we remain committed to
permitting another kind of selective abortion – namely, for disability.
The reason is this. Some members of the disability rights movement say that selective abortion for
disability is objectionable too, because it conveys a hurtful view about the worth of disabled people.
Yet I take it that most pro-choice advocates would not be happy to ban selective abortion for
disability on those grounds. Rather, they would, I think, respond as follows. First, that any perceived
disrespect is inadvertent. And second, that while equality for disadvantaged groups is vitally
important, it would be unfair to try to achieve it by banning selective abortion, and imposing high
costs on the women who need one. This line of reply, however, seems equally applicable in the
context of SSA.
Comparison with disability selection is also instructive when it comes to another major criticism.
This says that SSA represents an assault on women as a group, comparable to genocide – namely,
‘gynecide’. Parallel claims are sometimes made about selective abortion for disability: it is said that
it recalls the atrocities of the Nazi era, when disabled people were liquidated in vast numbers. In
both cases, however, the analogy seems dubious. Women’s choices to have selective terminations
are not part of a coordinated, intentional effort to wipe out a group. And if we have Pro-choice
beliefs, we will again emphasise that aborting a fetus is not morally equivalent to killing a person.
Drawing these threads together, my view is that, given our acceptance of abortion in Britain,
including selective abortion for disability, it would be inconsistent of us not to allow SSA – at least in
the sorts of urgent cases that I have described above. (I also think there are powerful reasons to
liberalise UK abortion law more generally, but that’s another story.) Since strong son preference is
not widespread in Britain, there seems little danger that allowing a degree of SSA would cause an
unbalancing of the sex ratio.
In a gender equal world, demand for SSA would be much reduced. So, if we are concerned to
minimise the practice, we should accelerate progress toward such a world. However, in the
meantime, banning SSA should give us significant moral qualms. For to do so appears to be to
force some people – pregnant women who need these abortions – to pay the price for our failure to
create a more just society.
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Why sex selection remains problematic, even if one is pro-choice.
Heather Widdows argues that sex-selective abortion is rightly contested. Legitimizing the
practice would give way to the commodification of children and lead to discriminatory practices
based on more than gender.
It is important to clarify that it is ‘sex-selective’ abortion that is in question here, not abortion in
general. The two issues should not be confused. Abortion is a basic right, a right to bodily integrity
that all non-slave men take for granted: a right not to have one’s body invaded against one’s will.
However, while there is a right not to have a child – not to be pregnant, not to give birth and not to be
a parent – this right does not extend to being able to choose the type of child one has. This is true of
being able to select sex, and also other ‘social traits’, when or if selection for such traits becomes
possible; including sexual orientation and physical traits (such as, height, eye-colour, hair colour and
intellect). This may sound far-fetched but a quick look at the selection of sperm and egg donors
suggests that recipients already seek to choose certain physical and intellectual traits. And while
sexual orientation is not possible to select for, there are already debates about whether (if it were) it
should be permitted.  
There are a number of reasons which mean that we should not allow selection of types of children
on grounds of preference alone (there are legitimate other grounds, such as, psychological harm to
the mother, or to avoid illness in the child). First, to be able to choose sex is ‘commodifying’ – it
makes people into things. The tendency to commodify people is increasing in the contemporary
market context. Bodies are more and more viewed as objects to be moulded and shaped (by diet,
exercise and surgery) and there is a danger that this extends to children – who can be viewed as
accessories and extensions of the self.
Second, to make choices before birth, is to have particular expectations about what or who the child
will be. This changes the relationship between parent and child from one of ‘gift’ to one of ‘contract’.
While parents always have expectations and hopes for their children – and might even be
disappointed – the ideal that we should love our children whatever they are like and whoever they
are is too important an ideal to erode by making children into types which we can choose. To reject
a child because it is not a child of the desired sex – for purely social reasons – moves too far
towards a contractual model of the parent/child relationship.
Third, the claim that these are ‘individual’ choices which only affect the particular family is just not
true. What is permitted and seen as socially acceptable affects everyone. If it is normal to have
expectations – and ones which you expect to be met, such as to have a child of a certain sex or with
certain traits – this is not ‘individual’, but ‘social’. Norms are social and cultural and shared. If
abortion for sex selection becomes normal and acceptable then views of all children will be affected
– children in general will be commodified – as children will become the types of things which
parents can choose rather than simply accept.
Fourth, discrimination is always a possibility if the selection of sex is permitted for social reasons.
The fact that there might not be a strong preference for sex of a certain type in the UK is not a
reason to be complacent. There may not be a strong preference in part because current norms
strongly promote and reinforce the view that children should be valued irrespective of their sex.
Generally it’s not thought to be OK for pregnant women to say ‘I don’t want a girl/boy’. However, if
sex selection by abortion (or by pre-implantation genetic diagnosis) were ‘normal’ this might no
longer be the case. As stated above what is ‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’ is changed as practices
change. Therefore, if it is a good thing that currently all children are seen as valuable, we should
endorse practices which promote this and encourage it to continue.
Fifth, it is no longer the case that one can ignore the global situation or the norms of different
cultures. In a multicultural society there are likely to be some social groups in the UK who do value
one sex over another. So even if the overall figures show no strong preference this does not mean
there is no discrimination. If sex selection is permitted in this country, people will travel to the UK to
make use of this service? Does the UK wish to become a destination for social abortion of this
type?
While brief, these arguments show that ‘choosing sex’ (or other types of children) should not be
permitted and that it is not an individual or trivial choice, but a social choice. Permitting sex
selection would affect everyone, because it would impact upon our common views and expectations
of children, and not just those families who actually take this option. However, while it is clear that
abortion to select sex on purely social grounds should not be permitted, policing this is more
problematic – for instance, should all sex tests be banned? But working out how to do something is
a different debate from what should be done and an issue for another day.
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1. A new amendment on abortion guidance will instead institute delays for women seeking
medical help
2. The House of Commons’ Select Committees are now more independent of government. But
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3. A complete ban on convicted sex offenders ever looking after children is unfair and
unnecessary. It may also leave the government open to legal challenges.
4. The Public Administration Select Committee continues to push for greater leadership on
reforms and for more strategic thought at the heart of government.
